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Abstract
In this paper, we set up a two-country general equilibrium model
where trade unions have wage bargaining power. We show that a
decrease in trade distortions inducing further product market integra-
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eﬀect. The implications of the specialization gains are similar to an
increase in labour productivity, whereas the labour market reform ef-
fect is similar to an increase in the degree of competition in the labour
market. Wages, employment and welfare increase as a result of further
product market integration. It is interesting to note that the labour
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an increase in the wage level.
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1 Introduction
The globalization process has been most visible in financial market interac-
tions and the growth in trade flows (see e.g. IMF (2002)). In contrast, labour
mobility has not been significantly aﬀected so far, and therefore labour mar-
ket implications have to arise as a response to changes in capital and goods
markets. From a European perspective, the indirect labour market conse-
quences are potentially very important given that European product market
integration is proceeding fast, and labour markets are often asserted to suﬀer
from structural problems. A view often raised in the debate is that the im-
plications of international integration are similar to a labour market reform
eroding the bargaining power of trade unions (see e.g. Rodrik (1997) and
Andersen, Haldrup and Sørensen (2001)). Although this may benefit soci-
ety as a whole, the income distribution may change to the disadvantage of
trade union members. The labour market reform eﬀect of product market
integration will be accompanied by specialization gains as a result of further
exploitation of comparative advantages (see e.g. Dornbusch, Fischer and
Samuelson, 1977). These specialization gains are going to increase labour
demand and counteract any downward pressure on wages of the labour mar-
ket reform eﬀect.
In this paper, we set up a two-country general equilibrium model where
product market integration gives rise to a labour market reform eﬀect as
well as an eﬀect on international specialization of production. Despite the
presence of the labour market reform eﬀect, it turns out that product market
integration gives rise to an unambiguous increase in real wages and employ-
ment. The reason is that lower product market frictions make it possible to
allocate production better according to comparative advantages, and this is
like a general productivity increase making it possible to improve both real
wages and employment. This shows that there are gains from product market
integration, also in economies with imperfectly competitive labour markets.
This result may explain why trade unions in most European countries have
been in favour of further European integration even though it is uncertain
how the market power of trade unions may be aﬀected in the process.
Most of the theoretical literature on the labour market consequences of
product market integration has focused on the implications of international
integration for the degree of competition in product markets and how this
aﬀects the market power that can be exerted in labour markets. Specifically,
it has been analysed how lower trade frictions aﬀect the market power in
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models of reciprocal dumping (see e.g. Huizinga (1993), Sørensen (1993),
Naylor (1998), Andersen and Sørensen (2000)).1 As is well known, the recip-
rocal dumping model can explain two-way trade in identical commodities,
and the basic reason for trade is product market power causing prices to ex-
ceed marginal costs, which induces cross-country market entry. While these
models yield a number of interesting insights they rely on one particular rea-
son for trade (i.e. reciprocal dumping), which has been contested, and also
strategic assumptions (i.e. Cournot competition), which can be called into
question (see e.g. Krugman (1995)).2 Moreover, these models tend to be
partial equilibrium models in the sense that they focus on a specific sector,
ignoring interdependencies among sectors, and ignoring changes in the range
of goods produced.
In this paper we present a general equilibrium analysis of the labour mar-
ket implications of product market integration leading to more specialization
in production and an increase in international (intra-industrial) trade. Re-
cent empirical evidence indicates not only a strong increase in intra-industrial
trade (see e.g. Coppel and Durand (1999)), but also in specialization (see
e.g. Midelfart-Knarvik et al. (2000)). To explain observed trade flows,
it is necessary to take into account comparative advantages, trade frictions
and the presence of non-traded commodities (see e.g. Davis and Weinstein
(2001) and Yi (2003)). It has also been documented that exporting firms
tend to have higher productivity than comparable non-exporting firms, and
the causality runs from productivity to export, i.e. productive firms become
exporters. Export is also associated with exit of less productive firms and
reallocation of resources to more eﬃcient firms (see e.g. Bernhard and Jensen
(1999a, 1999b)). The model presented here is in accordance with these styl-
ized facts.
The empirical findings reported above point out that intra-firm diﬀerences
are important for accounting for the empirical evidence. This has inspired a
large amount of work about intra-industry trade in the presence of firm het-
erogeneity (see e.g. Helpman, Melitz and Yeaple (2004), Eaton and Kortum
(2002), Bernard, Eaton, Jensen and Kortum (2003) and Bernard, Jensen and
1Driﬃll and van der Ploeg (1993) present a model with an exogenously given specialized
production structure, and show that wage formation is aﬀected when tariﬀs are lowered
because the responsiveness of prices to wages changes.
2Gürtzen (2002) presents a version of the model with Bertrand competition in commodi-
ties that are imperfect subsidies, i.e. specialization is implied by the preference structure
and unaﬀected by further product market integration.
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Schott (2003)). This paper is related in considering the role of firm hetero-
geneity for wage formation in economies with imperfectly competitive labour
markets. Endogenous trade and specialization have important implications
for the link between product and labour markets, and we consider how this
aﬀects wage formation, employment and welfare.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 develops a two-
country general equilibrium model with trade frictions and diﬀerences in
comparative advantages. Section 3 considers wage determination and the
basic eﬀects of product market integration, while section 4 analyses the gen-
eral equilibrium eﬀects of reductions in trade frictions. Section 5 decomposes
the net eﬀect of product market integration into a labour market reform ef-
fect and an eﬀect arising as a result of further specialisation of production.
Section 6 oﬀers a few concluding remarks.
2 Product market integration
Consider the following stylized case: We have two representative (European)
countries3 trading with each other in various products subject to trade fric-
tions. An ongoing integration process reduces frictions in goods trade. Nei-
ther real capital (suppressed) nor labour is mobile across countries. Product
markets are competitive,4 but labour is organized in trade unions setting a
wage under a right to manage structure. The countries are assumed to be
symmetric with respect to technology and the distribution of relative factor
supplies (see below).
Households
Households demand a variety of diﬀerentiated goods, and they can acquire
goods from either domestic or foreign producers. Each household supplies a
specific type of labour matching the labour requirements of one particular
production activity (see below). Moreover, households own firms and are
3The model considers trade between two countries with fairly similar factor endowment.
It can be seen as a model of the substantial amount of trade between e.g. European
countries.
4Note that the same mechanism determining the boundary between exports, imports
and non-tradeables is present if firms are in a monopolistically competitive (Bertrand)
position, see Andersen (2002).
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entitled to profits. The utility of the representative household type h ∈ [0, 1]
is assumed to be
Uh = ch − dlγh, γ > 1. (1)
This formulation captures the utility from consumption of the private con-
sumption bundle ch (see below), and the disutility of work lh. Note that d
normalizes the disutility of work to the utility of consumption. The budget
constraint of the household reads
Qch = Ih +Πh, (2)
where Q is the consumer price index (see below), Πh denotes nominal profits,
and Ih nominal labour income.
The consumption bundle, ch, is defined over commodities of diﬀerent
types, produced in diﬀerent sectors, indexed by j,
ch = [
Z 1
0
c
θ−1
θ
hj dj]
θ
θ−1 , (3)
where θ (> 1) measures the elasticity of substitution between the diﬀerent
types of goods. The associated price index is given by
Q ≡ [
Z 1
0
Q1−θj dj]
1
1−θ . (4)
The demand by household h of commodities of type j is given as
chj = [
Qj
Q
]−θch. (5)
The consumption bundle of goods of type j is similarly defined over subtypes
of products indexed by i, i.e.
chj = [
Z 1
0
c
θ−1
θ
hji di]
θ
θ−1 . (6)
For simplicity the elasticity of substitution between these subtypes of goods
is also assumed to be given by θ. The associated price index is
Qj ≡ [
Z 1
0
Q1−θji di]
1
1−θ , (7)
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and the demand by household h of commodity i, produced in sector j, is
given as
chji = [
Qji
Qj
]−θchj. (8)
Aggregate demands are found by aggregation of demand by individual house-
holds to read
cj = [
Qj
Q
]−θc, (9)
cji = [
Qji
Qj
]−θcj, (10)
where c is aggregate consumption.
Consumers can acquire commodities from either domestic or foreign pro-
ducers of consumption goods. A given variety i in the goods category j
is oﬀered by domestic producers at a price Pji in the domestic market and
by foreign producers at a price P ∗ji in the foreign market. However, there
are frictions involved in international trade (see e.g. Dornbusch, Fischer
and Samuelson (1977)) that can be seen as non-tariﬀ impediments to trade.
These costs can also be interpreted as information or search costs concerning
foreign markets, and they can include both fixed and proportional compo-
nents. However, since the qualitative results of the paper hold in either case,
we choose to work with the more simple case of proportional costs.
Let zji denote the gross costs of acquiring one unit from a foreign supplier.
Hence, zji ≥ 1 since acquisition of one unit of the commodity may absorb
resources to overcome trade frictions (zji = 1 corresponds to frictionless in-
ternational trade). It is assumed that the trade friction is a function of an
indicator variable τ , i.e. zji = zji(τ), where zji is increasing in τ . The para-
meter τ will in the following be varied to capture product market integration
arising from a reduction in trade frictions.
Domestic consumers choose a domestic supplier if
Pji ≤ P ∗jizji, (11)
while a foreign supplier is chosen if
Pji > P ∗jizji. (12)
It follows that the consumer price Qji = Pji if the final good is acquired
from a domestic producer, and Qji = P ∗jizji if it is acquired from a foreign
producer.
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Producers
Firms in sector j produce goods of type j by use of labour type j, subject to
a linear production technology
yji = Ajilji, (13)
where Aji is an exogenous productivity parameter for a firm producing good i
in sector j. The productivity parameter allows for trade based on diﬀerences
in comparative advantages (see below).
The relative productivity of domestic labour to foreign labour in produc-
ing commodity i in sector j is defined as
aji ≡
Aji
A∗ji
. (14)
The comparative advantage variable aji is symmetrically distributed with a
density function5 g(aji), where aji ∈ [λ−1, λ], λ > 1.6 This implies that aji = 1
for i = 1/2, that is, for half the goods produced in sector j, the domestic
economy has a comparative advantage relative to the foreign country and
vice versa. Note that it is an implication that the average skill levels are the
same in the two countries. The distribution of comparative advantages can
reflect historic specialization in various product varieties (see e.g. Grossman
and Helpman (1995)).
The production structure captures the fact that various producers in a
certain sector convert similar kinds of input into diﬀerent final consumption
goods. There is perfect competition and, hence, the price is
Pji = A−1ji Wj. (15)
where Wj is the wage rate in the domestic country in sector j.
Using this price formula, it is possible to determine which final goods are
produced domestically, and which are imported. To this end consider first
5It is assumed that g(aji) < g∗, i.e. the distribution of comparative advantage does
not have too much mass at a single point.
6Assume that Aji is uniformly distributed over the interval [1− x, 1 + x] and similarly
for A∗ji. Hence
Aji
A∗ji
is distributed over the interval
h
1−x
1+x ,
1+x
1−x
i
, with a density function
with the property that g( 1
y
) = g(y).
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the condition ensuring that domestic consumers choose a domestic supplier
(i.e. (11)), which can be written as
A−1ji Wj ≤ zjiA∗−1ji W ∗j , (16)
or
wj ≤ zjiaji, (17)
where wj =
Wj
W∗j
is the relative wage.
Similarly, foreign consumers choose domestic suppliers if
wj ≤ z−1ji aji. (18)
We thus have that a specific commodity i in product group j is exported
provided i ∈ Ej, where
Ej ≡
©
i | wj < z−1ji aji
ª
(19)
is a non-traded good provided i ∈ NTj, where
NTj ≡
©
i | zjiaji ≥ wj ≥ z−1ji aji
ª
, (20)
and, finally, that it is imported if i ∈ Ij,where
Ij ≡ {i | wj > zjiaji} . (21)
Whether given commodities are exported, imported or non-traded is deter-
mined endogenously depending on relative wages, comparative advantages
and trade frictions. Trade can be interpreted as intra-industrial trade since
there is trade within industry j with some product types being exported
and other types being imported. It is an implication that trade is related to
specialization as export goods are only produced in the home country and
vice versa for import goods. The non-traded sector represents varieties be-
ing produced in both countries. If lower trade frictions lead to more trade
(see below) and a shrinking non-tradeable sector, it follows that this is ac-
companied by more specialization. Observe that two-way trade of identical
commodities never occurs (ji), but export and import of commodities of a
given category do (j).
For later reference, observe that consumer prices are given as
Qji =
½
Pji = A−1ji Wj if i ∈ Ej U NTj
zjiP ∗ji = zjiA
∗−1
ji W
∗
j if i ∈ Ij
, (22)
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and therefore
Qj =
"
W 1−θj
Z
i∈Ej∪NTj
Aθ−1ji di+W
∗1−θ
j
"Z
i∈Ij
z1−θji A
∗θ−1
ji di
## 1
1−θ
. (23)
Since all sectors are symmetric this also defines the aggregate price level
(Qj = Q).
Labour demand
The demand for labour of variety j can now be determined. Although not
directly in competition over jobs with foreign workers, domestic workers are
aﬀected by international trade since the wage rate aﬀects the competitiveness
of domestic firms and hence which goods are traded.
From the perspective of the workers, the home market is thus
Hj = Ej ∪ NTj = {i | wj ≤ zjiaji} , (24)
and the export market is
Ej =
©
i | wj < z−1ji aji
ª
. (25)
We make the monotonicity assumption that both aji and zji are monoto-
nously increasing in i, where εaji,i > εzji,i.
7 It then follows that there exists
a critical value of i- in the following denoted iH- with the property that all
i ≥ iH belong to Hj. Similarly, there is a critical value of i - in the fol-
lowing denoted iE- with the property that all i ≥ iE belong to Ej. Note8
that iE ≥ iH . It also follows that iE = iE(wj, τ), and iH = iH(wj, τ), where
∂iE
∂wj > 0, and
∂iH
∂wj > 0, i.e. an increase in the relative wage of domestic labour
increases the range of goods being imported and reduces the range of goods
being exported. A reduction of trade frictions leads to an increase in iH
and a decrease in iE, i.e. more imports and exports, and the non-tradeables
sector shrinks. Figure 1 illustrates the endogenous determination of which
goods are traded and the direction of trade as well as how this is aﬀected by
a reduction of trade frictions.
7In the following εx,y denotes the elasticity of x wrt y.
8Since zji ≥ 1, it follows that i ∈ Ej ⇒ i ∈ Hj , while i ∈ Hj ; i ∈ Ej .
9
Figure 1:
 
   
Using the demand and production functions (i.e. (9), (10) and (13)), the
total labour demand in sector j can be written
Lj =
Z 1
iH
1
Aji
[
Qji
Qj
]−θ[
Qj
Q
]−θcdi+
Z 1
iE
zji
Aji
[
Q∗ji
Q∗j
]−θ[
Q∗j
Q∗
]−θc∗di, (26)
The first part on the RHS gives the labour demand generated by supplying
goods to the domestic market, and the second part is the labour demand gen-
erated by supplying to the foreign market. Inserting the relevant consumer
prices, we find that
Lj = φ
H(
Wj
W ∗j
, τ)[
Wj
Q
]−θc+ φE(
Wj
W ∗j
, τ)[
Wj
Q∗
]−θc∗ (27)
where
φH(
Wj
W ∗j
, τ) ≡
Z 1
iH
Aθ−1ji di, (28)
φE(
Wj
W ∗j
, τ) ≡
Z 1
iE
z1−θji A
θ−1
ji di. (29)
Note that φH is positively related to the share of production going to the
home market, and φE to the share of production going to the foreign market.
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Equilibrium conditions
Assuming that there are no profits in equilibrium, it follows from the budget
constraint of the households that
c =
Z 1
0
WjLjdj. (30)
It is an implication that trade is balanced. Moreover, employment is demand
determined (see (27)) given the right to manage structure underlying wage
formation (see below). Finally, and total demand for a given product variety
equals supply, i.e.
cji + c∗ji = yji for i ∈ Ej, (31)
cji = yji for i ∈ NTj, (32)
cji + c∗ji = y
∗
ji for i ∈ Ij. (33)
Similar relations hold for the foreign country.
3 Wage formation
We assume that workers supplying labour for production in sector j are orga-
nized in a trade union that sets the wage under a right to manage structure,
and take all aggregate variables as given. The trade union is assumed to
be utilitarian, and, since the disutility of work is increasing in employment,
trade union members share the employment. That is the wage is chosen so
as to solve
Max Uj =
Wj
Q
Lj − dLγj , (34)
where the number of trade union members has been normalized to one. The
wage rate turns out to be
Wj
Q
=
εLj ,Wj
1 + εLj ,Wj
dγLγ−1j . (35)
Equation (35) gives the wage curve as depending on the mark-up parameter,
determined in the usual way via the elasticity of labour demand εLj ,Wj , the
parameter d determining the level of disutility of work, and the amount
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of employment. Note that the wage is increasing in employment with an
elasticity of γ − 1 > 0.
Labour demand elasticity
The wage curve (35) links product and labour markets via the mark-up de-
termined by the labour demand elasticity εLj ,Wj and, therefore, the trade-oﬀ
between wages and employment faced by workers. The latter aﬀects the ef-
fective market power of trade unions, and since it depends on product market
structures it is aﬀected by product market integration.
The labour demand elasticity is found to be:
εLj ,Wj = −θ + vεφH ,Wj + (1− v)εφE ,Wj , (36)
where v denotes the share of production going to the home market
v ≡
φH(WjW∗j
, τ)[WjQ ]
−θy
φH(WjW∗j
, τ)[WjQ ]
−θy + φE(WjW∗j
, τ)[WjQ∗ ]
−θy∗
. (37)
One important fact concerning the demand elasticity for labour is that its
numerical value exceeds the underlying elasticity of consumer demand, i.e.
(see Appendix I)
εLj ,Wj < −θ, (38)
for v < 1, i.e. when there is trade. The intuition is that there are two dimen-
sions of substitution, i.e. between diﬀerent commodities and between domes-
tic and foreign suppliers. The former is determined by consumer preferences
and is given by the parameter θ, which is assumed constant. The latter ef-
fect arises via reallocation of production between domestic and foreign firms.
This can also be termed a relocation of production and thus employment
eﬀect due to tighter product market integration. In other words, it implies
that production (employment) becomes more "mobile" across national bor-
ders even though there is no factor mobility. Labour demand elasticity is
thus higher in an open than in a closed economy where it is only determined
by the degree of substitution in consumption. How further integration aﬀects
the labour demand elasticity is, however, ambiguous, i.e.
∂εLj ,Wj
∂τ
=
∂
h
vεφH ,Wj + (1− v)εφE ,Wj
i
∂τ
R 0. (39)
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Therefore, in general it is not possible to conclude whether the unions’ eﬀec-
tive bargaining power decreases or increases as a result of an increase in τ .
As shown below, it is still possible to make inferences on how real wages and
employment are aﬀected in general equilibrium.
4 General equilibrium
The global or two-country general equilibrium can fairly easily be worked out
exploiting the symmetry conditions in the model.
Trade
First consider trade. In the symmetric equilibrium, the home markets in the
two countries are of equal size, i.e.
iH = 1− iE. (40)
Lower trade frictions imply that iH increases and iE decreases. From (40),
it follows that there is an increase in the range of exported commodities,
which is similar to the increase in the range of imported commodities. That
is, the non-tradeable sector decreases both because more goods are exported
and because more goods are imported. Consequently, production becomes
more specialized reflecting that the allocation of production across countries
to a larger extent reflects comparative advantages. Trade is thus driven
by productivity (comparative advantages), and production becomes more
eﬃciently allocated, the lower the trade frictions are.
Productivity
Aggregate labour productivity for the types of activities in operation domes-
tically can be written
A ≡
R 1
iH AjidiR 1
iH di
, (41)
from which it follows that
∂A
∂iH
=
£
A−AjiH
¤ Z 1
iH
di > 0. (42)
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A lower trade friction (τ) implies that iH increases and, therefore, that av-
erage productivity goes up.9 The intuition is that further product market
integration implies that less eﬃcient domestic production is squeezed out by
more productive foreign production, i.e. production becomes more eﬃciently
allocated across countries according to comparative advantage (see also e.g.
Melitz (2003)). As a result, aggregate labour productivity goes up, which
means an outward shift in the possibility set of real wages and employment
available to the economy.
Wages and employment
Turning to equilibrium real wages and employment, we find by imposing
the conditions for a symmetric equilibrium on (27) that the real wage is
determined from the relation
1 =
£
φH(1, τ) + φE(1, τ)
¤
[
W
Q
]1−θ. (43)
The definitions of φH and φE (see (28) and (29)) and (40) imply that
∂φH(1, τ)
∂τ
+
∂φE(1, τ)
∂τ
> 0. (44)
It follows that the real wage is decreasing in the level of trade frictions, by
use of (44) and (43), i.e.
∂
³
W
Q
´
∂τ
< 0. (45)
Lower trade frictions lead to higher real wages for two reasons, namely the
direct eﬀect arising from lower prices of all imported commodities, and the
indirect eﬀect arising from better match of production according to compara-
tive advantages. The latter is like a general productivity increase, cf. above.
It is noteworthy that demand elasticity εLj ,Wj does not enter this expression.
It follows straightforwardly (by using (27), (44) and (45)) that employ-
ment is also decreasing in the level of trade frictions, i.e.
∂L
∂τ
< 0. (46)
9Note that since production is distributed according to comparative advantage, and the
relative productivity of domestic firms is increasing in index i, it follows that A > AjiH .
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Accordingly, a reduction of trade frictions leads to an increase in both real
consumption wages and employment in equilibrium.
Welfare
Finally, consider the welfare eﬀects. The utility of households can in sym-
metric equilibrium be written
U =
W
Q
L− dLγ. (47)
By using (35), (45) and (46), it follows that
∂U
∂τ
=
∂WQ
∂τ
L+
·
εLj ,Wj
1 + εLj ,Wj
− 1
¸
dγLγ−1
∂L
∂τ
> 0. (48)
A decrease in the trade friction (τ) gives rise to an unambiguous improvement
in welfare, the reason being that a gain arises from higher real wages as well
as from higher employment. There are several reasons for the increase in
welfare. The reduction in trade costs saves resources, which in turn leads to a
decrease in consumer prices. Furthermore, since more goods are traded, there
is increasing specialization in goods production, which also tends to give rise
to lower consumer prices. Finally, observe that the higher the market power
of unions (the less sensitive employment is to wages), the lower employment
is and, therefore, the larger the gains from improvements in employment.
5 Labour market reform versus specialization
gains
In the present framework wage formation is distorted due to the market power
of unions (imperfectly competitive labour markets), and this obviously causes
an eﬃciency loss. However, although product market integration does not
aﬀect the formal position of the union (it remains a monopoly union operat-
ing under a right to manage structure), its possibilities for exerting market
power changes. The reason is that the scope for relocation of product and
specialization induced by lower trade frictions changes the trade-oﬀ between
wages and employment, cf. above. The change in the "eﬀective" market
power of unions is the reason the eﬀect of product market integration has
been termed an indirect labour market reform, cf. introduction.
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However, based on the results presented above, it is not possible to as-
sert the importance of this labour market reform eﬀect. The reason being
that there is also a specialization eﬀect (and subsequent standard gains) due
to lower trade friction, and this eﬀect would be present also in a competi-
tive labour market. To disentangle the labour market reform eﬀect from the
specialization eﬀects so as to ascertain the relative strength of the two, we
are going to compare the outcome in the case of a competitive labour mar-
ket (index C below) with the imperfectly competitive case considered so far
(index IC below). By definition, the former case has no market distortions
and it, therefore, isolates the specialization eﬀect implying that the diﬀer-
ence between the competitive and imperfectly competitive case reflects the
importance of market power in the labour market.
The demand side of the economy is the same in the competitive case as
in our main case with imperfect competition. However, in the competitive
case, the wage curve (the inverse supply function of labour) reads
Wj
Q
= dγLγ−1j , (49)
which should be compared to (35) in the case of imperfect competition on
the labour market, i.e. the diﬀerence is captured by the wage mark-up de-
termined by the elasticity of labour demand.
It is easily seen that the real wage in general equilibrium becomes the
same in the competitive version as in the imperfect competition version of
the model (determined by (43)). Hence, the only diﬀerence is the level of
employment which, in the competitive version, becomes:
LC =
µ
W
Qdγ
¶ 1
γ−1
. (50)
In the imperfect competition version it becomes
LIC = ηLC , (51)
where
η =
µ
1 + ε
ε
¶ 1
γ−1
< 1. (52)
η can be termed the employment eﬃciency factor since it measures the re-
duction in employment caused by market power in the labour market and
16
thus the eﬃciency consequences of imperfect competition measured in terms
of employment. An increase in η is equivalent to a decrease in the labour
market distortion. We see that the labour market distortion is closely re-
lated to the labour demand elasticity. Hence, if the labour demand elasticity
increases, the labour market distortion decreases and vice versa.
Welfare can be written
U i =
W
Q
Li − d
¡
Li
¢γ
, i = C, IC, (53)
and by use of (50) and (51) welfare in the two cases can be written
U IC = ξUC , (54)
where
ξ =
γ
1
1−γ e− γ
γ
1−γ eγ
γ
1
1−γ − γ
γ
1−γ
< 1 (55)
is a measure of the utility consequences of imperfect competition. The utility
factor ξ measures by how much utility is lowered due to market power in the
labour market. Obviously, this utility loss is related to the eﬃciency loss
measured in terms of employment since
∂ξ
∂η
=
γ
1
1−γ − γ
1
1−γ eγ−1
γ
1
1−γ − γ
γ
1−γ
> 0. (56)
Hence, the less ineﬃciency in the labour market (i.e. the higher η), the
smaller the welfare loss in the imperfectly competitive case compared to the
competitive case.
To simplify, we will in the following assume that the cost of international
trade is the same for all goods (i.e. zji = z ∀ i, j). Moreover, we assume a
uniform density for absolute productivity, i.e.
Aji =
1
λ
+ (λ− 1
λ
)i, ∀i ∈ [0, 1] ,
A∗ji = λ− (λ−
1
λ
)i, ∀i ∈ [0, 1] ,
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which implies that relative productivity is given as
aji =
1
λ + (λ−
1
λ)i
λ− (λ− 1λ)i
=
1 + (λ2 − 1)i
λ2 − (λ2 − 1)i
.
Hence, relative productivity or comparative advantage varies between 1λ2 for
i = 0 and λ2 for i = 1. It can be shown (see Appendix II) that a uniform
distribution is suﬃcient to ensure that labour demand becomes more elastic
to the wage rate when product markets become more integrated, i.e.
∂εLj ,Wj
∂τ
< 0, (57)
when evaluating the elasticity in a symmetric equilibrium. It follows that
a decrease in τ gives rise to an increase in the eﬃciency of the imperfectly
competitive labour market, i.e. there is an increase in η and ξ. In other
words, under these circumstances, there is a labour market reform eﬀect of
product market integration. It is important to note that the labour market
reform eﬀect is achieved despite an increase in the equilibrium wage rate.
This is in contrast to most "real" labour market reforms, which usually seek
to diminish wages or other labour costs that are "too high" due to labour
market distortions
If there is an increase in the labour demand elasticity, there is a labour
market reform eﬀect, but the importance of the labour market reform eﬀect
relative to the specialization gains is an open question. To gain further
insights into the relative importance of the labour market reform eﬀect, we
turn to some numerical results.10 However, we want to emphasize that, since
our model is highly stylized, these simulations are only suggestive.
10The numerical illustrations are based on the following parameter values: d = 1, γ =
3, θ = 2 and λ = 2. Note that the results are fairly robust to variations in the parameter
values. However, the discrete jump arising in the employment eﬃciency and utility factor,
when moving from autarky to trade, is very sensitive to the elasticity γ.
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Figure 2: Numerical illustrations
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Figure 2.i shows how the labour demand elasticity depends on trade costs.
We see that there is a jump in the labour demand elasticity when trade costs
are reduced from a high level with no international trade (i.e. z > 4) to
a level where international trade begins (i.e. z < 4). When the process of
international integration proceeds and lower trade costs, it is seen that labour
demand becomes more andmore sensitive to the wage rate (the labour market
reform eﬀect of product market integration).
This change in the labour demand elasticity has a number of eﬀects.
Figure 2.ii illustrates how trade costs aﬀect employment in the imperfect
competition case relative to employment in the competitive case (i.e. e in
(52)). A decrease in trade costs gives rise to a discrete increase in relative em-
ployment when trade is induced, and further reductions in trade costs makes
employment approach the competitive level more, but without reaching this
level in the case of free trade, i.e. free trade does not eliminate market power.
Interestingly figure 2.iii shows that the wage rate is increasing in the trade
cost, i.e. the specialization eﬀect, always dominates the labour market reform
eﬀect.
Finally, in figure 2.iv, we illustrate how the utility of a representative
household develops relative to the utility of a representative household in
the competitive economy (i.e. ξ in (55)). Similar to the employment results,
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we see a discrete change when trade is induced, and then an increase in the
utlity factor as trade costs are lowered.
6 Concluding remarks
We have analysed the eﬀects of product market integration (i.e. a reduction
in international trade frictions) in a setting with trade driven by comparative
advantages and with imperfectly competitive (unionized) labour markets. In
the following, we summarize our main results.
Product market integration gives rise to further specialization in goods
production. Hence, more goods are traded, which in turn means more eﬃ-
cient exploitation of comparative advantages. We have also shown that this
is very similar to a general increase in labour productivity.
Product market integration gives rise to an increase in the wage level as
well as an increase in employment. This implies that there is an increase in
the welfare of a representative consumer.
In our model, a decrease in trade costs gives rise to specialization gains
as well as a labour market reform eﬀect. The labour market reform eﬀect is
a result of an increase in the labour demand elasticity, which is similar to a
labour market reform increasing the degree of competition in the labour mar-
ket. The labour market reform eﬀect of further product market integration
seems to be most important when trade costs decrease from a high level.
The intention of most "real" labour market reforms is to decrease wages
or other labour cost that are too high due to labour market distortions. It
is interesting to note that product market integration gives rise to a labour
market reform eﬀect despite an increase in the wage level.
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APPENDIX I
From (28) and (29) we have
φH(
Wj
W ∗j
, τ) =
Z 1
iH
Aθ−1ji di, (58)
φE(
Wj
W ∗j
, τ) =
Z 1
iE
z1−θji A
θ−1
ji di. (59)
First, we notice that φH(WjW∗j , τ) ≥ φ
E(
Wj
W∗j
, τ). This follows by observing that
z−θji ≤ 1 and iH ≤ iE.
Next, we shall prove that vεφH ,wj +(1− v)εφE ,wj < 0 for v < 1. Note first
that
wj = ajiHzjiH , (60)
wj = ajiEz
−1
jiE . (61)
defines iHand iE as implicit functions of wj, where ∂i
H
∂wj > 0,
∂iE
∂wj > 0, since
∂
¡
ajiHzjiH
¢
∂i
i
ajiHzjiH
= εaji,i + εzji,i > 0,
∂
³
ajiEz
−1
jiE
´
∂i
i
ajiEz
−1
jiE
= εaji,i − εzji,i > 0,
where the signs follow from the monotonicity assumptions made on aji and
zji.
It now follows straightforwardly that
εφH ,wj = −A
θ−1
jiH
∂iH
∂wj
wj
φH
< 0, (62)
εφE ,wj = −A
θ−1
jiE z
1−θ
jiE
∂iE
∂wj
wj
φE
< 0. (63)
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For 0 ≤ v < 1, it follows that vεφH ,wj + (1 − v)εφE ,wj < 0. Note that for
v = 1, we have iH = 0 and εφH ,wj = 0.
APPENDIX II
In the following, we prove that, if the cost of international trade is the same
for all goods (i.e. zji = z ∀ i, j), and if there is a uniform density for absolute
productivity, it follows that in the symmetric global general equilibrium:
∂εLj ,Wj
∂z
< 0.
To see this we have from (36) that the labour demand elasticity is
εLj ,Wj = −θ + vεφH ,Wj + (1− v)εφE ,Wj , (64)
where v denotes the share of production going to the home market
v ≡
φH(WjW∗j
, τ)[WjQ ]
−θy
φH(WjW∗j
, τ)[WjQ ]
−θy + φE(WjW∗j
, τ)[WjQ∗ ]
−θy∗
. (65)
In the symmetric equilibrium where y = y∗, it follows that
v ≡ φ
H(1, τ)
φH(1, τ) + φE(1, τ)
,
and
φH(
Wj
W ∗j
, τ) ≡
Z 1
iH
Aθ−1ji di,
φE(
Wj
W ∗j
, τ) ≡
Z 1
iE
z1−θji A
θ−1
ji di.
Note that ∂i
H
∂τ < 0,
∂iE
∂τ > 0 and therefore
∂φH
∂τ > 0,
∂φE
∂τ < 0. It now follows
that v is increasing in the trade friction τ , i.e.
∂ν
∂τ
=
∂φH
∂τ φ
E − ∂φE∂τ
¡
φH + φE
¢£
φH + φE
¤2 > 0.
The critical values of the i-indexes iH and iE are defined from
wj = ajiHz,
wj = ajiEz
−1,
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and therefore
∂iH
∂w
w
iH
=
·
∂ajiH
∂iH
iH
w
¸−1
,
∂iE
∂w
wj
iE
=
·
∂ajiE
∂iE
iE
ajiE
¸−1
.
Note that εiH ,w and εiE ,w are independent of z.
From Appendix I we have
εφH ,Wj = −εiH ,w
Aθ−1jiH i
H
φH
,
εφE ,Wj = −εiE ,w
z1−θAθ−1jiE i
E
φE
,
which inserted in (65) yields:
vεφH ,Wj + (1− v)εφE ,Wj = −
φH
φH + φE
"
εiH ,w
Aθ−1jiH i
H
φH
#
− φ
E
φH + φE
"
εiE ,w
z1−θAθ−1jiE i
E
φE
#
=
−1
φH + φE
h
εiH ,wA
θ−1
jiH i
H + εiE ,wz
1−θAθ−1jiE i
E
i
= −
z1−θAθ−1jiE
φH + φE
£
εiH ,wi
H + εiE ,wi
E¤ < 0,
where it has been used that in symmetric equlibrium Aθ−1jiH = z
1−θAθ−1jiE . This
follows from observing that in symmetric equilibrium, the absolute level of
productivity at which domestic firms start to export (and foreign markets to
import) must equal the absolute level of productivity at which foreign firms
start to export (and domestic markets to import), i.e. AjiE = AjiE∗ and
AjiH = AjiH∗ . Next using the definition ajiE =
AjiE
AjiH∗
= z, the above stated
condition follows.
Hence
∂
h
vεφH ,Wj + (1− v)εφE ,Wj
i
∂z
= −∂Γ
∂z
£
εiH ,wi
H + εiE ,wi
E¤−Γ∂ £εiH ,wiH + εiE ,wiE¤
∂z
,
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where
Γ ≡
z1−θAθ−1jiE
φH + φE
=
Aθ−1jiE
zθ−1
R 1
iH A
θ−1
ji di+
R 1
iE A
θ−1
ji di
,
and where it has been used that
φH + φE =
Z 1
iH
Aθ−1ji di+ z
1−θ
Z 1
iE
Aθ−1ji di.
It follows that
∂Γ
∂z
=
(θ − 1)Aθ−2jiE
zθ−1
R 1
iH A
θ−1
ji di+
R 1
iE A
θ−1
ji di
∂AjiE
∂z
−
Aθ−1jiE (θ − 1)z
θ−2 R 1
iH A
θ−1
ji dih
zθ−1
R 1
iH A
θ−1
ji di+
R 1
iE A
θ−1
ji di
i2 ,
which is negative if·
zθ−1
Z 1
iH
Aθ−1ji di+
Z 1
iE
Aθ−1ji di
¸
A−1jiE
∂AjiE
∂z
− zθ−2
Z 1
iH
Aθ−1ji di < 0,
or
∂AjiE
∂iE
∂iE
∂z
z
AjiE
<
zθ−1
R 1
iH A
θ−1
ji di
zθ−1
R 1
iH A
θ−1
ji di+
R 1
iE A
θ−1
ji di
∈
·
1
2
, 1
¸
.
Note that the RHS of this expression has a value beween 1
2
and 1. Note also
that
∂iE
∂z
z
iE
=
·
∂ajiE
∂i
i
ajiE
¸−1
,
and
∂ajiE
∂i
i
ajiE
=
∂Aji
∂i
i
AjiE
−
∂A∗ji
∂i
i
A∗jiE
.
Hence
∂AjiE
∂iE
iE
AjiE
∂iE
∂z
z
iE
=
∂AjiE
∂iE
iE
AjiE
∂AjiE
∂iE
iE
AjiE
−
∂A∗
jiE
∂iE
iE
A∗
jiE
.
From this expression it can be inferred that
∂AjiE
∂iE
iE
AjiE
∂iE
∂z
z
iE
<
1
2
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is a suﬃcient condition that ∂Γ∂z < 0. Note that the suﬃcient condition is
equivalent to
∂AjiE
∂iE
iE
AjiE
∂AjiE
∂iE
iE
AjiE
−
∂A∗
jiE
∂iE
iE
A∗
jiE
<
1
2
,
or
∂AjiE
∂iE
iE
AjiE
< −
∂A∗jiE
∂iE
iE
A∗jiE
.
Below it is shown that this condition is fulfilled when productivity is distrib-
uted according to the uniform density function.
Next consider the term
∂
¡
εiH ,wiH + εiE ,wiE
¢
∂z
= εiH ,w
∂iH
∂z
+ εiE ,w
∂iE
∂z
=
¡
εiH ,w − εiE ,w
¢ ∂iH
∂z
.
Since ∂i
H
∂z < 0, a suﬃcient condition for
∂(εiH,wiH+εiE,wiE)
∂z < 0 is that¡
εiH ,w − εiE ,w
¢
> 0,
or εaji,i is increasing in i. This holds for the uniform density, cf. below. It
follows that a suﬃcient condition for
∂εLj ,Wj
∂τ
< 0,
is a uniform density for absolute productivity.
A uniform density for absolute productivity implies that
Aji =
1
λ
+ (λ− 1
λ
)i, ∀i ∈ [0, 1] ,
A∗ji = λ− (λ−
1
λ
)i, ∀i ∈ [0, 1] .
Hence
∂Aji
∂i
i
Aji
=
(λ− 1λ)i
1
λ + (λ−
1
λ)i
,
∂A∗ji
∂i
i
A∗ji
=
−(λ− 1λ)i
1
λ − (λ−
1
λ)i
,
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from which we have
∂Aji
∂i
i
Aji
< −
∂A∗ji
∂i
i
A∗ji
,
since
(λ− 1λ)i
1
λ + (λ−
1
λ)i
<
(λ− 1λ)i
1
λ − (λ−
1
λ)i
.
Relative productivity can be written
aji =
1
λ + (λ−
1
λ)i
λ− (λ− 1λ)i
=
1 + (λ2 − 1)i
λ2 − (λ2 − 1)i
,
and therefore
∂aji
∂i
i
aji
=
(λ2 − 1)
£
λ2 − (λ2 − 1)i
¤
+ (λ2 − 1)
£
1 + (λ2 − 1)i
¤£
λ2 − (λ2 − 1)i
¤2 i £λ2 − (λ2 − 1)i¤£1 + (λ2 − 1)i¤
=
(λ2 − 1)
¡
λ2 + 1
¢£
λ2 − (λ2 − 1)i
¤ i£
1 + (λ2 − 1)i
¤
=
£
(λ2 − 1)
¡
λ2 + 1
¢¤ i
λ2 + (λ2 − 1)2(i− i2)
> 0.
It follows that the suﬃcient condition for
∂εLj,Wj
∂z < 0 is fulfilled when pro-
ductivity is uniformly distributed.
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